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Exorbitant CEO pay is linked to firm performance. But CEOs
are rewarded more for good performance than they are
punished for failure.
The Occupy movement has brought attention to top CEOs as never before. Many are
concerned that this pay is not linked to firm performance. Brian Bell from the LSE’s Centre
for Economic Performance finds that while CEO pay is in fact linked to performance,most
workers do not see similar increases when firms perform well.
In the wake of the financial crisis the pay of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) in top
companies is high on the agenda of policymakers all over the world. Two linked factors seem
to be responsible for this. First, the pay of CEOs and other senior executives has risen much
faster than that of ordinary workers. Second, there is growing concern that this pay is
unrelated to the actual contribution of CEOs to the business they run. Corporate scandals from Enron to
Worldcom to Merrill Lynch seem to suggest that executives are more concerned with extracting value from
the business than improving the long-run performance of the firm. At the same time average employees’ real
wages have been falling and the ordinary worker does not seem to benefit from the firm performance used to
justify high CEO pay.
Since CEOs are clearly in ‘the top 1%’, they bear the wrath of the Occupy movement. And new research into
the link between the pay of senior executives and the performance of their firms sheds more light on this
issue. We have created a database of pay for CEOs, senior executives and workers covering over 400 UK
firms since 2001. These firms account for about 90 per cent of UK stock market capitalization. This is the first
time that data covering everyone from the CEO to a cleaner in a large sample of firms has been collected
and linked to stock market performance in this country. It allows us to rigorously explore how pay changes as
the performance of the company varies.
CEO pay rises more than that of ordinary workers
CEOs earn around 40 times more than the average worker – but this multiple rises to around 80 if we look
only at the very top companies; i.e. the FTSE 100. The majority of pay for CEOs comes from bonuses and
stock incentive plans, whereas 95 per cent of workers’ pay comes from basic salary. Our evidence shows
that when performance improves, so does pay, but it goes up much more for CEOs than for ordinary
workers. For example, if the firm’s value as measured by shareholder returns increases by 10 per cent,
CEOs on average get an extra 3 per cent in pay, while workers get only 0.2 per cent more, as Figure 1
shows:
Figure 1: Pay increases for firms’ employees as shareholder return increases by 10%
This close pay-for-
performance link among
CEOs is a recent
development. Evidence
from the 1980s and early
1990s found almost no link
between pay and
performance for top
executives. Our research
shows that the correlation
between pay and
performance is now is
driven by bonuses and
incentive packages which
have become more
important in recent years.
So we now find a strong link
between CEO pay and
company performance.
Poorly performing firms are much more likely to boot out their CEOs and when the firm does badly, CEO pay
also goes down.
Figure 2: CEO pay changes and shareholder returns
CEO Pay goes down as well
as up – but not by as much
An important fact to bear in
mind, however, is that CEO pay
cuts for failure are not as
speedy as pay increases on the
upside. So although it is true
that CEOs are not just
“rewarded for failure”, they get
more pleasure when the
company’s performance goes up
than they feel pain when the
company’s performance goes
south.
Of course, these average effects
of performance on pay cover both well-governed firms that use pay to incentivize their CEO and poorly
performing firms that overpay for questionable talent.  In addition, it is hard to claim that the majority of the
pay gains for most CEOs over the last decade can be linked to performance given the relatively poor returns
to shareholders over the period.
In terms of policy, we think there are strong grounds for encouraging a more transparent reporting of pay by
companies. Many annual reports are unnecessarily complicated in reporting of executive pay and, perhaps
inadvertently, tend to obscure the size and nature of the pay awards. We also think that there should be a
requirement for each and every board to explain to shareholders and the public how the pay growth of their
CEO is tightly linked to the performance of the company. Those that fail this test must be held to account by
shareholders.
Full details of this research are available in “Firm Performance and Wages: Evidence from Across the
Corporate Hierarchy” Brian Bell and John Van Reenen, CEP Discussion Paper 1088.
